number of attributes (states) that represent system characteristics such as the number of working processors. The more attributes included in the model design the more complex the system will be.
Modeling a system with Markov model require representing each state of the system with their attributes, which considered system characteristics. Where, the smallest set of attributes included in the model the less complex the system will be and can describe the fault behavior. The engineering for system focus design and development efforts on the functional behavior required under normal operating conditions and given environmental assumptions such that consideration of failure scenarios could postponed until the design is completed. Thus, Safety analysis should be conducted to identify possible ways to improve the reliability and safety in the DFWCS system [6] . The next step in the modeling process is to characterize the transition time from one state to another. The system architecture used degradable triplex system. Which means transition from one state to another represents a failure with a non-constant rate. The reliability of the system is often faced many of such trade-off cases where real time critical systems should be conservative direction and represent system failure properly.
In this paper, the conservative approach will be used exclusively. All transitions in the reliability model are deducible from its architecture. This measurability is the main consideration in developing a model for a digital system. The transitions of a fault-tolerant system are divided into two categories: slow failure transitions and fast recovery transitions. If the states of the model are defined properly, then the slow failure transitions can be obtained from field data. The primary problem is to model the system so that the determination of these transitions is as easy as possible. If the model has many detailed states, the number of transitions that must be measured can be exorbitant. The paper will enlighten the expectations results of designing reliability and safety model of a digital feedwater control system. We used the computer program SURE (Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator) [7] [8] to solve reliability model numerically with Markov Model to design fault tolerant Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) used to control the input water level in its associated steam generator.
II.

Overview of the Digital Feedwater Control System
Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) is used to control the input water level in its associated steam generator [9] from approximately 1% reactor output power up to 100% reactor output power. DFWCS is basically divided into four divisions: sensors module, fault-tolerant group1 module, fault-tolerant group2 module, and actuators module. Fault tolerance techniques based on redundancy management are typically used to detect the fault occurrence in digital systems. The redundancy can either be in time, or in hardware, which is called passive redundancy and used to identify the permanent faults occurring in combinational logic circuits [10] .
The DFWCS contains a redundancy management scheme to organize the behavior of the system and avoid going to unsafe failure mode. For example, a duplication Main and Backup digital processing unit that works as a pair-ofcomparing module, which can read various inputs through digital sensors interfaced to processors via wired connection and write control outputs to the actuating unit, is used as a fault-tolerant group1. Each one of these two processing units use at least two types of independent error detection techniques such as watch dog timers and self-testing unit which both are assumed to be non-perfect. The monitored inputs (sensors readings of the Plant) include reactor power level, steam and water flow, water temperature, and water level. The digital processor outputs number of sets of the operating positions of two valves: Main Flow Valve (MFV) and Bypass Flow Valve (BFV), and the Feedwater Pump (FWP) as shown in the overview figure Fig.1 and in the architectural design figure Fig. 2 . The Main and Backup digital processors operate as a redundant pair, each of which reads the inputs and deliver the outputs. In case the Main processor fails, the Backup processor can take over the operation of the system. The outputs of both the Main and Backup processors are passed to a set of four Proportion, Integral, and Derivative (PID) Controllers. Three of these controllers assigned to the Main Flow Valve (MFV), Bypass Flow Valve (BFV), and Feed-Water Pump (FWP) respectively, while the fourth controller acting as a spare PID controller for either the MFV or BFV PID controllers, as shown in Fig. 2 . If both main and backup processors fail, the PID controllers can operate in a manual mode. Loss of any PID controller with both processors failed is system loss. Loss of PID that is detectable leading to fail-safe shutdown and the loss of PID undetectable leading to fail-unsafe must be considered in the design and analysis.
Fig.1. Overview of the Digital Feed-Water Control System
The PID associated with each of the controlled devices performs a "reasonableness" check of the desired setting from the Main processor and delivers the final output to the controlled device. In the event that the main processor fails, and it is detected, the backup processor takes over. The DFWCS operates in one of two primary modes: (1) Low Power Control Mode, or (2) High Power Control Mode. The first mode is used when the reactor power is less than approximately 15% and, in this mode, the MFV is normally closed, and the BFV is manipulated to control the water level in the associated steam generator. The second mode is used when the reactor power is between approximately 15% to 100% and in this mode the BFV is normally closed, and the MFV is manipulated to control the water level in the associated steam generator.
Fig.2. System Architectural Design
In order to increase the fault tolerance of the system, several Override Modes exist which under certain conditions allow the MFV or BFV to be used if the normally controlled valve has failed. For example, in Low Power Control Override Mode, the BFV can be bypassed and the MFV can be manipulated to control the water level. Given that tha basic parameters for the Markov model: = Failure transitions. C= Error detection and reconfiguration coverage. S = State. Also, other parameters can be listed as: The table below shows different requirements of the altered safety integrity levels (SIL) in dependence to the probability of failure. The determination of probability of failure is extensively explained in [11] .
DFWCS Component Name
Failure Rate Parameter (per hour) Power Level Sensor 
Design Requirements and Specifications
The design requirement of the DFWCS control system is required to be 0.99 reliable over a 6-month time. Also, the probability of being in an unsafe state should be less than 10 -3 . Accordingly, we classify the important states in the Markov model as operational, Fail-operational, Fail-safe, and Fail-unsafe. The markov model has been solved by using the NASA WinSURE and the NASA WinSTEM software programs. Coverage of 0.90 was assumed for both the processor coverage (Cc controller) and the PID coverage (Cp id) initially. The coverage rate was changed throughout the process of testing the model to observe the impact of the system reliability and system safety. The other specifications are listed as follows:
a. Determine the transitions between states based on the operational narrative of the digital system. b. Assume non-perfect coverage of the error detection mechanisms. Our approach to model the system should be guided by partitioning the model into fail safe states and fail unsafe sates. c. The proposed Markov model has used the NASA WinSure program, assume .90 coverage (initially). d. Then, we determine the probability of being in a failsafe at the end of 400 hours and 4000 hours, and the probability of being in a fail unsafe at the end of 400, 4000 hours. The list of the assigned symbols and coefficients used in the Markov Model is shown in table 1: 
IV.
Approach used and its Implementation
To calculate the reliability and the safety of the DFWCS control system, seven states Markov model has been constructed. This model includes five operational states, one failed safe state, and one failed unsafe state as it is shown in table 2. The Markov model is intended to be illustrative of the typical parameters used in a analytical model [12] , is shown in Fig. 3 . The Markov model of the system is shown in Fig. 3 Fail Safe (two PID fail with detection, two processors and MFV PID fail with detection) (System doesn't function and doesn't cause harm) failure is successfully detected by the self-diagnostic test) 7
Fail Unsafe (death) (two PID fail without detection, two processors and MFV PID fail without detection) (System doesn't function and does cause harm) failure is not detected by the self-diagnostic test)
The model contains seven states that represents all cases that we have assumed for the system. State 1 and state 4, which both are called fully operational states; represent the case where all the components of the DFWCS control system are operating correctly. State 2, which is called fail operational state, represents the system in which either the main processor or the spare processor has failed, and that problem has been successfully detected by either the watchdog timer or the self-test process that occur inside the MFV PID. State 3, which is called fail operational state, represents the system in which both the main processor and the spare processor have failed and detected correctly. In this state, the MFV PID has used as a manual processor. State 5, which is called fail operational state, represents the system in which, either the BFV PID or the FWP PID, has failed and that problem has been detected and successfully corrected. State 6, that is called fail safe state, represents the system safely failure and controlled. A one can reached state 6 through the failure of two PIDs with successful detection due to the sequence of two faults, or through the failure of two processors and MFV PID because of the three faults sequence. State 7, which is called fail safe state, in which the system fails unsafely and cannot being controlled. A one can reached state 7 through the failure of two PIDs with successful detection due to the sequence of two faults or through the failure of two processors and MFV PID because of the tree faults sequence.
Fig. 3. Transition State Diagram for a Digital Feed-Water Control System
Fig. 4. Simulation of Transition State Diagram for a Digital Feed-Water Control System using WinSURE Software program
The circles shown in figure Fig. 4 , represent the seven different states. The reference numbers (17) are represent the transition state for Markov Model in the NASA WinSURE software. The transitions arrows include the failure rates for different components, fault coverage values, and repair rates [9] . The transitions illustrated on the state diagram of Fig. 3 , can be explained as follows: the transition from state 1 to state 2 can occur only if one of the two processors is failed (see Fig. 3 ), that failure is detected either by the watchdog timer or by the self-diagnostic of the PID, and this failure is handled correctly. Whenever this failure is not detected, the system will go into state 7, in which the system fails unsafely and may cause harm to the operators and the environment. The second transition from state 2 into state 3 is occurred only if both the online processor and the spare processor are failed and the MFV PID is used as a manual processor to keep the functionality of the system. Also, the system will go into death state (State 7), if the failure of these two processors is not detected. After the occurrence of third sequenced fault that affect on the MFV PID, the system will either go into state 6 or into sate 7 based on the successful detection of the self-diagnostic test. The transition from state 4 into state 5 can be occurred only if one PID either BFV or FWP is failed and detected correctly. After that, the system will become vulnerable to the effect of the second fault that takes the system either into state 6 or into sate 7, depending on the successful detection of this fault. The system is being repaired in three different states that are state 2, state 3, and state 5 and the repair rate in those states during Δt time is μ Δt.
The Markov model equations for the designed system can be written in matrix form, and as following:
Psystem (t + Δt) = Tsystem * Psystem(t)
Where: Tsystem: The state transition matrix. Psystem(t): The probability of being in the corresponding state at the time t.
Psystem ( t + Δt ): The probability of being in the corresponding state at the time t + Δt.
V.
Reliability and Safety Modeling Analysis of the DFWCS
The mathematical equations of the proposed markov model of the designed system can be written from the state diagram shown in Fig. 3 . [13] . For example, the probability of the system being in a state 2 at time t + Δ t depends on the probability that the system was in a state from which it could transition to state 2 and the probability of being in that state. The probability equations of the Markov model and the resulted 2D state transition matrix that includes all the failure rates and fault coverages for the system are shown below. The probability that a system will be failed at some time (t + Δt)
The equations of the discrete time Markov model for the digital feed-water control system can be written as:-P (t + Δt) = T-system P-system (t) ➔ P ( ) = T-system P-system (0)
The reliability of the system: R (t) = 1-P7 (t) = P6 (t) + P5 (t) + P4 (t) + P3 (t) + P2 (t) + P1 (t)
Where:- 
Results and Discussions
Digital systems have multiple failure modes that depend on the detail (state space) that is embedded in modeling a system [14] [15] . For the designed DFWCS control system will be completely operational as long as the system is in one of five states: state 1, state 2, state 3, state 4, and state 5 (see Fig. 3 ). As a result, the reliability of the system described by the seven states Markov model can be written as follows: -Reliability R (t) = P1 (t) + P2 (t) + P3 (t) + P4 (t) + P5 (t). However, the DFWCS control system will be safe if it is in one of six states: state 1, state 2, state 3, state 4, state 5, and state 6. The safety of the system described by the seven states Markov model can be written: Safety S (t) = P1 (t) + P2 (t) + P3 (t) + P4 (t) + P5 (t) + P6 (t). Reliability R (t) of a system is a function of time and is defined as the conditional probability that the system will perform its functions correctly throughout the interval [t0, t], given that the system was performing correctly at time t0. Safety S (t) of a system is defined as the probability that the system will either perform its functions correctly or will discontinue the functions in a manner that causes no harm.
When the "Plot" option was selected using the NASA WinSURE software program, the system unreliability is plotted over time. The plot shown in Fig. 5 , shows that the probability of being in a death (unsafe) state after 400 hours is 0.00002 and the probability of being in a death (safe) state after 4000 hours is 0.00016. This means that the reliability is 0.9998 as it is highlighted in table 3 (fault coverage is 0.999). The requirements of the assignment required that the state remain 0.99 reliable for 6 months. Therefore, the system does meet reliability requirements. The Probability of being in each operational state and in a death state for the digital feed-water control system is shown in Fig. 6 using WinSURE Software program. The Probability of being in each operational state and in a death state for a digital feed-water control system is shown in Fig. 7 using WinSTEM Software program. 
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, a conservative Markov modeling analysis for a digital feed-water control system (DFWCS) was presented. The computer program NASA WinSURE (Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator) has been used to solve reliability model numerically with Markov Model to design fault tolerant Digital Feed-Water Control System (DFWCS) used to control the input water level in its associated steam generator. The simulation results of modeling the digital control system proves that the proposed model has achieved the reliability and safety design requirements for the system with the probability of being in fully operational states is 0.99 over a 6 months' time.
